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Increasing competition and expectations from customers pressures carriers to further improve efficiency. Forming
collaborations is essential for carriers to reach their targeted efficiency levels. In this study, we investigate an
auction mechanism to facilitate collaboration amongst carriers while maintaining autonomy for the individual
carriers. Multiple auction implementations are evaluated. As the underlying decision problem (which is a
traditional vehicle routing problem) is known to be NP-hard, this auction mechanism has an important inherent
complexity. Therefore, we use fast and efficient algorithms for the vehicle routing problem to ensure that the
auction can be used in operational decision making. Numerical results are presented, indicating that the auction
achieves a savings potential better than the thus far reported approaches in the literature. Managerial insights are
discussed, particularly related to the properties of the auction and value of the information.1. Introduction
Customers expect faster and more reliable deliveries and increased
flexibility, which compels carriers to increase the efficiency and accuracy
of their transportation services. Cooperation has the potential to develop
synergistic approaches and reduce costs. This is particularly the case for
small carriers, who individually cannot achieve appropriate economies of
scale. Collaboration between carriers is then almost becoming a necessity
to survive, certainly given the increased competition. Ultimately,
collaboration results in fewer on-road vehicles, reduced empty mileage
drives, and lower carbon emissions, as shown in Perez-Bernabeu et al.
(2015).
Following the sharing and platform economy, there is a growing in-
terest in sharing resources. These platforms make it easy to rent out
underutilized resources in a peer-to-peer but also business-to-business
(B2B) settings. Examples for peer-to-peer are: AirBnB (renting out your
homewhen at holiday) or Snappcar (renting out your car when not used).
In a B2B setting, especially for our problem under consideration, also
many initiatives take place. For example, Convoy is a digital (auctioning)
platform that matches carriers with shippers, currently valued at 2.75
billion dollars (Ohnsman (2019)). Utilizing the work of Berger and
Bierwirth (2010), the platform auctions pickup and delivery requests
from shippers to carriers. The largest competitor of Convoy is Uber
Freight, which utilizes a dynamic pricing system to match demand from
shippers with supply from carriers (or individuals). This dynamic pricing
algorithm is not open source, and therefore its effectiveness is hard toels), l.p.veelenturf@tue.nl (L.P. V
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ional Research Societies (EURO).assess. On the other hand, scientific research on auctioning systems in
exchange transport requests is abundant (Gansterer and Hartl (2018b)).
Also in practice, horizontal collaboration is slowly increasing between
competitors, as seen in Gerdes (2014). In our paper, we investigate
whether it is also interesting for carriers and logistic service providers
(LSPs) to put requests on these auctioning systems.
Linking our suggested auctioning system to the planning software of
the carriers makes it possible for them to determine the cost (gain) of
adding (removing) the requests to (from) their existing pool of requests.
With the results of the real-life based case, discussed in Section 6.2.5, we
show that algorithms exist that allow for enough precision to estimate
these costs to allow for a effective run of these auctions. While non-
truthful bidding is a possibility, we assume that there is collective
rationality.
In this paper, we consider distribution carriers that daily solve a
(capacitated) vehicle routing problem (VRP, see e.g. Laporte et al.
(1986)), possibly including time windows (VRPTW). These carriers
prefer to collaborate horizontally, as large savings can be achieved in
horizontal collaboration by carriers (Cruijssen et al. (2007)). However,
importantly, carriers prefer to remain autonomous such that they obtain
the benefits of collaboration without completely merging their activities.
Therefore, we introduce a collaborative environment that extends and
generalizes the work of Berger and Bierwirth (2010). Two important
benchmarks are used to evaluate the collaborative environment. First, we
compare the performance of the collaboration versus an environment
without collaboration. Second, we compare collaboration versus aeelenturf), t.v.woensel@tue.nl (T. Van Woensel).
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Fig. 1. Abstract examples of routing on networks.
Fig. 2. Example of our single item Limited Reassignment Auction.
Table 1
An example of cash flows.
Carrier 1 2 3
Cash out () 9 0 0
Cash in (þ) 0 0 9
Old routing costs (þ) 90 70 80
New routing costs () 50 70 89
Savings (¼) 31 0 0
Table 2
An overview of the auctions.
Limited Combinatorial
Single Request selection LRA(SB) CRA(SB)
Route-based selection LRA(RB) CRA(RB)
Cluster-based selection LRA(CB) –
Note that LRA(SB) is equal to the SRRA method of Berger and Bierwirth (2010)
and the CRA(SB) method equal to the BRRA method of Berger and Bierwirth
(2010).
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a single company. In this specific setup, a single delivery plan is formu-
lated, referred to as the central plan in the remainder of this paper. Ex-
amples of a plan without collaboration and a central plan are shown in
Fig. 1.2
Consider a carrier who owns a distribution center and a fleet of trucks
to service a set of customers. These customers, usually chains of stores
under a particular brand, operate locations around the country. In an
effort to minimize inventory space at the stores, these customers have
most of their inventory at a distribution center of a logistic service pro-
vider (carrier). Periodically goods are delivered to the stores by the
carrier. Suppose two carriers exist according to the aforementioned
description, carriers A and B. Carrier A’s customers are in the market
segments: ‘shoes’, ‘sports clothing’ and ‘pet food’, while carrier B cus-
tomers are in the market segments: ‘electronics equipment’, ‘sports
equipment’ and ‘cosmetic products’. Note that while in this example
these market segments are non-overlapping, multiple customers exist
within any segment and market segments for logistics service providers
could potentially overlap. The competing carriers have most likely cus-
tomers in the same cities, but for both the demand to a single city center
is less than a full truckload. In such a situation savings can be obtained in
merging the customers of both carriers in the same city into a single
route. Note, to achieve this, products have to be re-positioned a priori. To
make this a possibility, the carriers should start a collaboration and
should be willing to share (partial) information about their customers.
Sharing information is sensitive. As carrier A receives information
about customers from carrier B, they might realize that some locations
from ‘electronics equipment’ can be very easily absorbed in their
network. This might result in carrier A producing an offer to this
customer of carrier B, undercutting them. This, in turn, results in a loss of
revenue for carrier B. This possibility generates fear and mistrust for the
Fig. 3. Example of clustering.
Fig. 4. Example of clustering.
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in a setting which they trust. The central plan leads to the lowest total
transportation cost for the carriers, but also requires carriers to share
complete information of their customers. This complete information is
rarely, if ever, shared between competing carriers because of the afore-
mentioned fears. For our collaborative environment, we propose an
auction mechanism to exchange requests which we call the Reassignment
Auction. Such an auction can be implemented as a physical, or elec-
tronical auction. An advantage of an auction is the fact that the partici-
pating carriers can decide themselves which information to reveal (e.g.Fig. 5. The Limited Reassignment
3
they can decide to not share some very sensitive high profit customers).
This, in turn, increases trust (Pomponi et al. (2015)). Note that, for
collaboration to exist in this form, at least some information must be
shared among the participants.
The main contributions of this paper are as follows:
 The Reassignment Auction given in Berger and Bierwirth (2010) that
reallocates requests among participating carriers, is generalized in two
ways. Compared to Berger and Bierwirth’s two auctioning mecha-
nisms, we test an additional three.
1. We introduce the Limited Reassignment Auction (LRA) allowing for
sets of requests to be submitted to the auction, to be transferred in
its entirety. The Single Request Reassignment Auction (SRRA) of
Berger and Bierwirth (2010) is a special case of this auction. This
auction is also extended with a tabu list. Additionally, we show the
strength of using routes and clusters as submitted sets. For the
latter, we introduce a novel cluster recognition algorithm.
2. We introduce the Combinatorial Reassignment Auction (CRA) where
the Combinatorial Auction Problem (CAP) is solved for the reas-
signment problem. Participants are not only allowed to bid on the
offered set, but also on all potential subsets. As a result, the Bundle
Request Reassignment Auction (BRRA) of Berger and BierwirthAuction with tabu, LRA(tabu).
Fig. 6. Example of the cluster auction.
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illustrate the effect of submitting routes as bundles.
 The Reassignment Auction variants are applied to carriers who solve
the VRP(TW), an auction variant that has received little attention in
the literature. Applying auctioning mechanisms to pick-up and de-
livery problems is easier compared to more traditional vehicle routing
problems, as such problems require the re-positioning of requests a
priori.
 We use fast routing algorithms that allow the Reassignment Auction
to be applied to problems of real-life sizes (3 carriers with 2967 re-
quests in total).Fig. 7. The algorithm fo
Fig. 8. Example of the co
4
 Valuable insights based on the outcomes of the reassignment auction
are discussed. This includes the understanding with regards to the
value of information sharing in relation to cost savings. It is also
shown that during the auction, the marginal value of information
decreases.
The structure of this paper is as follows. The following section briefly
discusses the literature on horizontal collaboration. In Section 3, a con-
ceptual collaboration model is introduced, which is formalized in Section
4. In Section 5, the computational results are discussed. The last section
concludes this paper with the main insights and possible future work.
2. Literature research
In this section, the literature regarding carrier collaboration on
routing services is discussed. Consider the review paper by Gansterer and
Hartl (2018b), where this collaboration is subdivided into centralized
versus decentralized planning. Central planning usually involves the
participating carries to have perfect information with regards to all
request portfolios. In such collaborations, profit sharing occurs after the
central plan has been formulated, usually through game-theoretical
principles. In decentralized planning the participants have imperfect to
no information about the request portfolios of the other carriers. The
method for exchanging requests can be exceedingly complex however,
and auctioning has currently been the dominant method in the literature.
We note that there exists a lot of research focused on horizontal collab-
orations. In this section we delineate only the most relevant literature for
the positioning of our paper.r cluster detection.
mbinatorial auction.
Table 3
Results for the vehicle routing problem.
Gap to central plan Savings Savings with repositioning Requests revealed
μ σ μ σ μ σ μ σ
1 50.52% 19.44% 21.95% 9.52% 6.14% 4.46% 29.96% 11.88%
2 17.31% 8.48% 39.01% 6.74% 22.40% 3.52% 100% –
3 13.05% 14.14% 41.38% 7.25% 23.16% 5.21% 100% –
4 10.96% 12.43% 42.07% 6.87% 23.63% 5.17% 100% –
5 16.44% 7.86% 35.97% 6.33% 21.30% 3.41% 61.44% 7.74%
6 0.003% 0.01% 47.60% 2.49% 28.73% 1.30% 100% –
1LRAðSB;100%Þ ¼ SRRA (Berger and Bierwirth, 2010).
2.LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
3.LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
4.LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;CB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;100%Þ
5CRAðSB;100%Þ ¼ BRRA (Berger and Bierwirth, 2010).
6.CRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ
Table 4
Results for the vehicle routing problem with time windows.
Gap to central plan Savings Savings with repositioning Requests revealed
μ σ μ σ μ σ μ σ
1 60.67% 18.69% 28.99% 9.12% 8.32% 4.23% 24.96% 9.61%
2 21.87% 7.99% 46.11% 5.23% 24.56% 4.01% 100% –
3 17.55% 16.81% 48.43% 9.03% 25.01% 6.89% 100% –
4 13.34% 15.95% 49.67% 8.55% 26.27% 6.81% 100% –
5 22.24% 8.36% 47.34% 3.94% 24.84% 3.95% 59.116% 6.97%
6 0.006% 1.55% 55.98% 4.13% 28.02% 3.67% 100% –
1LRAðSB;100%Þ ¼ BRRA (Berger and Bierwirth, 2010).
2.LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
3.LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
4.LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;CB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
5CRAðSB;100%Þ ¼ BRRA (Berger and Bierwirth, 2010).
6.CRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ
Table 5
Legend for Figure 11.
1LRAðSB;100%Þ ¼ BRRA (Berger and Bierwirth, 2010)
2LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
3LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
4LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;CB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ
5CRAðSB;100%Þ ¼ BRRA (Berger and Bierwirth, 2010)
6CRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ
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Early research on horizontal collaboration between independent
freight carriers was performed by Kopfer and Pankratz (Kopfer et al.,
1999). They investigated a groupage system, and first coined the term
collaborative transport planning (CTP). Krajewska and Kopfer (2006)
introduced an exchange mechanism for CTP consisting of three phases:
preprocessing, exchange mechanism, and profit sharing. The requests to
be exchanged are identified and valued during the preprocessing phase.
Subsequently, the requests are exchanged in such a way that it matches
the central plan, potentially resulting in savings. The fair allocation of the
savings is later determined during the profit sharing phase. This fair
allocation of savings is firmly nested in the field of cooperative game
theory, where the participating carriers form a coalition. One possible
fair allocation is the Shapley value introduced by Shapley (1953) that
uniquely distributes the savings among the participants. Further litera-
ture in this research direction is often similar to these ideas. Wang and
Kopfer (2011) discussed the opportunities and challenges of each of these
phases.Cruijssen and Salomon (2004) showed that order sharing be-
tween companies can lead to remarkable savings in the order of 5–15%.
They also mentioned that trust is a challenge for achieving collaboration,5
which makes simple order sharing difficult. Cruijssen et al. (2007) also
investigated the opportunities and obstacles carriers face in horizontal
collaborations. Topics such as a fair allocation of the savings and carrier
differentiation have been discussed. Trust and extent of cooperation was
also discussed by Pomponi et al. (2015), who presented an evolutionary
mechanism to generate trust. Krajewska et al. (2008) subsequently
introduced an implementation of the mechanism from Krajewska and
Kopfer (2006) for the pickup and delivery problem with time windows
(PDPTW). They showed that collaboration results in a significant cost
decreases and that efficient profit allocation is possible. Hezarkhani et al.
(2016) introduce a solution for the sharing of savings where logistic
providers perform joint planning of truckload deliveries, which enables
the reduction of empty kilometers. They compare their solution to several
existing solutions and show that their solution has some desirable
properties. Vornhusen et al. (2014) also investigated the PDPTW,
extending it with transshipment points for the collaborating carriers.
Their model was translated into an MIP model and realized reasonable
cost reductions. Finally, Wang et al. (2017) investigated the capacitated
VRP with the above-mentioned mechanism. Finally, Cuervo et al. (2016)
performed simulation studies on the effects of partner characteristics on
the collaborative coalition. They conclude that coalitions with similar
order sizes achieve the best savings. Futhermore, the larger the order
portfolios, the more gains can be achieved through forming collaborative
coalitions. Savings generated by centralized planning could be a bench-
mark for collaboration by auctions. It shows the maximal savings po-
tential that could be generated, even with imperfect information. Most
literature show savings in the order of 20%–30%.2.2. Decentralized collaboration by auctions
Berger and Bierwirth (2010) introduced a new direction related to
Fig. 9. Relation between the savings and the percentage of requests shared as information.
Fig. 10. Savings as a result of information revealed.
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mechanism formulated by Krajewska (Krajewska et al., 2007), i.e., profit
sharing, but instead focused on the exchange mechanism. Berger and
Bierwirth (2010) utilized the ideas from the work of Song and Regan
(2005), which initiated the concept of examining requests separately. A
substantial part of their work was on determining whether an order
should be exchanged, which is a complex decision for a carrier depending
on several factors. Each bundle of items auctioned generates savings for
the auctioneer and profits for the bidder, negating the necessity for profit
sharing after the exchange phase. Each participating carrier is both a
bidder and an auctioneer, resulting in extremely localized auctions. The
auctioning of bundles of requests results in an NP–hard combinatorial
auctioning problem (CAP). Wang and Kopfer (2014) noted that by uti-
lizing their approach the cost savings potential was on average 18.2%–
64.8%, which was lower compared to the savings from the central
plan.The underlying routing problem defined by Berger and Bierwirth
(2010) is the traveling salesman problem with pickup and delivery. Dai
and Chen (2011) used the same concepts as formulated by Berger and6
Bierwirth (2010) and applied them to a pickup and delivery problem for
a reduced truckload freight. They introduced an iterative auctioning
system with some distinct properties. Multiple auctions can happen
simultaneously. They showed that significant gains could be incurred
using this system. Wang and Kopfer (2014) discussed the PDPTW and
applied a route-based bidding mechanism, where the bids were based on
the routes they generated. Li et al. (2015) formulated a request exchange
approach based on a single request and introduced four profit allocation
strategies. They included new exchange approaches that avoid local
optima and showed some promising results. In general though, the
literature agrees that clusters affect the performance of single item auc-
tions in a negative way. Jacob and Buer (2018) investigated the effects of
bidding non-truthfully. They showed that non-truthful bidding is not
collectively rational, but individually it is, and it directly results in
something similar to the famous prisoner’s dilemma. Gansterer and Hartl
(2016) investigated several request evaluation strategies for the auction
mechanism proposed by Berger and Bierwirth (2010). By replacing the
exact approach with a heuristic, they could solve larger instances for the
Fig. 11. Savings in relation to non–exchangeable requests. See Table 5 for
the Legend.
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consider the geographical location dominate other strategies. When
submitting bundles to the auction, Gansterer and Hartl (2018a) show that
very attractive subsets of these bundles can be effectively identified. This
greatly reduces the computation complexity of auctions involving sets, as
well as all possible subsets. More recently frontiers were pushed by
Gansterer et al. (2019) where it was shown that the auctioneer should
bundle requests. Furthermore, a new formula for the profit sharing me-
chanic was introduced, which is computationally tractable and guaran-
tees individual rationality.
This paper is rooted in the literature regarding decentralized collab-
oration based through auctions. In a lot of research the pickup and de-
livery problem is investigated. The reason for this is obvious, requests are
then independent between carriers. In our problem, we considerFig. 12. Cost of the network
Table 6
Savings as a function of α.
α 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2
Savings 9.3% 15.2% 17.3% 19.2%
Average cluster size 2 2.1 2.5 3
7
distribution networks. The result is that the goods have to be re–posi-
tioned among the depots post–auction. Which makes the auction only
profitable if the savings made by redistributing the customers is larger
than the extra re-positioning cost. This issue is more deeply investigated
in the remainder of the paper.
3. Conceptual environment
A set of independent carriers is considered, with each carrier
providing similar transportation services to their customers. Each carrier
has a sufficiently large and homogeneous fleet of vehicles, and each
vehicle has a known maximum capacity. They also have their own single
depot, and all the requests need to be served (potentially within a certain
time window). The travel and service times are considered to be deter-
ministic. The objective of the carriers is to maximize profit. Assuming
that the price of the service paid by the customers is fixed and given, as
specified by their contract, the decision problem is actually a cost mini-
mization problem. Goods have to be re-positioned a priori among the
depots. In this paper, carriers collaborate and apply the Reassignment
Auction to exchange requests.
3.1. Collaborative environment
In this section, the collaborative environment, including the trade
mechanism, is discussed in detail. Carriers may choose to serve only their
own requests, but they can also subcontract requests to other carriers, or
accept requests offered by these carriers. This trading of requests is
performed by an auction, denoted as the Reassignment Auction.
In each iteration, a selling carrier submits a candidate set of requests to
the auction. The size of the candidate set of requests depends on the
selection method used. In this paper, a few selection methods are dis-
cussed. These are selection methods based on single requests, a specific
combination of requests based on certain criteria (clusters), or complete
routes (see Section 3.2.1 for more details).
The selling carrier selects the candidate set to be submitted to the
auction based on marginal cost (i.e., the cost difference between theas a result of distance.
0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45
21.2% 18.9% 16.7% 14.2% 12.6%
3.6 4.6 5.3 5.9 6.5
Fig. 13. Savings if controlled for information revealed for the real–life case.
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excluding this set of requests). This concept of the marginal cost is
formalized in Section 4. The set with the largest marginal cost is pre-
sented at the auction.
All participants, excluding the selling carrier, subsequently bid on this
set of requests and become bidding carriers. In our auction, each bidding
carrier bids their true cost, defined as the marginal cost incurred by
including the extra requests in their service. The participant with the
lowest bid has the lowest marginal cost of servicing the request of the
candidate set, and thus, wins the auction so that the auctioned set is
added to his requests. In this manner, the overall savings are maximized.
Note that to evaluate the bids, the selling carrier also needs to evaluate its
own marginal cost for the offered request. If his own marginal costs are
lower than the bids, he rejects the bids and keeps the requests in his own
portfolio.
Whenever a carrier submits a candidate set to the auction, informa-
tion of this request is shared with the other carriers. This information
consists of the location and quantity of the request. For any form of
horizontal collaboration to exist between these competitors, information
must be shared. The participants can however decide how much infor-
mation to share. Carriers can limit the sharing of information in two
ways. There can be set a maximum amount of information to be shared or
carriers can select a predefined set of requests that they will not share
with the other carriers, fearing it will be used to obtain a competitive
edge.
The relationship between savings and the information revealed is
very dependent on the distribution of goods geographically and among
the participants. For example, if the initial solution to the instance is
already the optimal solution, no request will be exchanged while some
information will be shared. Furthermore, if all requests are always
positioned very close to the depot of another participant, sharing infor-
mation will result in the maximum amount of savings. Both are extreme
instances. However, in general there will be a positive correlation be-
tween information shared and the savings.
In summary, the Reassignment Auction follows these steps (see Sec-
tion 4 for details):
 Step 1. The selling carrier computes the marginal costs for all the
candidate subsets in his request set.
 Step 2. Among the candidate subsets, the most expensive subset of
requests is selected as the candidate set to be submitted to the auction.
 Step 3. Each bidding carrier bids on this subset.
 Step 4. The candidate set is reassigned to the buying carrier(s).8
During step 4, in the Limited Reassignment Auction (LRA) a candidate
set is only allowed to be reassigned in its entirety. In the Combinatorial
Reassignment Auction (CRA), participants can bid for the full set, but also
for all possible subsets. The candidate set can then be reassigned to
multiple carriers whose combined bid wins. This is referred to as the
Combinatorial Auction Problem, discussed in Section 4.3.
It is required to re-position the goods between the depots prior to the
execution of the plan. This re-positioning can in general be performed by
less costly transportation methods, such as using Longer Heavier Vehicles
or rail. Alternatively, vertical collaboration can cause the suppliers to
directly deliver goods to the right depot. As such, we assume trans-
portation costs between depots to be lower per kilometer than the actual
delivery itself. The savings can only be determined when the auction is
completed, and information is revealed. In our experiment we will focus
on this specific situation as well. Moreover, the decision for re-
positioning can also be made during the auction, as an example when
enough requests have been exchanged to fill a truck. However, making
the decision during the auction can be a research topic in itself, weighing
the potential future cost savings of continuing the auction against the
ordering of a extra truck.
Note that there is the topic of who pays for the re-positioning cost and
the implementation and maintenance of the online auctioning system.
While several game-theoretical possibilities here exist, it holds that the
auctioneer using the “re-positioning” space the most is also the partici-
pant who has gained the most savings through the auction.3.2. Candidate set selection
We consider several request selection methods for the Reassignment
Auction. These are, as mentioned in section 3.1, one request, complete
routes, or a specific combination of requests based on clusters. We first
introduce the candidate sets of single requests, before considering the
multi-item sets.
3.2.1. Candidate sets of single requests
Whenever a candidate set is submitted consisting of a single request,
it works differently for the LRA compared to the CRA.
Limited Reassignment Auction. In this part, we discuss the investigation of
the Limited Reassignment Auction (LRA) with the special case of a candi-
date set of size 1. This is equivalent to the Single Request Reassignment
Auction (SRRA) as mentioned in Berger and Bierwirth (2010). See Fig. 2
for an illustration of this auction. Consider the three participating carriers
prior to commencing the auction, who will participate in the Limited
Fig. 14. Results for a real–life based case.
Table 7
Cash-flows for the real–life based case.
Carrier 1 2 3
Cash out () 2.945 1.210 2.875
Cash in (þ) 1.363 3.894 1.773
Old Routing costs (þ) 19.769 6.095 7.562
New Routing costs () 11.187 8.447 6.460
Difference (¼) 8.582 2.352 1.102
Table 8
Performance for the real–life based case with alpha ¼ 0:25.
Savings Savings with re-
positioning
Gap
Results for the real–life based
case
21.2% 16.8% 12.9%
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Reassignment Auction with a single request selection method. Each
participating carrier offers a candidate request to the auction by turn. A
round is completed when each participating carrier has taken his turn.
The auction stops when no requests are reassigned during a round. This is
the original stopping criterion of Berger and Bierwirth (2010). Carrier 1
starts, and offers his request 14 with the highest marginal costs, 40, on
the auction. During the round Carrier 2 bids 27 and carrier 3 bids 9 for
this request. Carrier 3 is subsequently the winner, adds request 14 to his
request set, and receives 9 in payment from carrier 1. This results in
savings of 31 for carrier 1.
Suppose the initial total costs for carriers 1 through 3 was, 90, 70 and
80 respectively. Table 1 reflects all cash flows. Multiple strategies can be
implemented to divide savings among the participants. However, redis-
tribution of these savings is the topic of game theory, which is not within
the scope of this research.
It is improbable for the Limited Reassignment Auction with candidate
set size 1 to reach the cost savings potential realized by the central plan,
V.C.G. Karels et al. EURO Journal on Transportation and Logistics 9 (2020) 100009as illustrated in Fig. 3. In this example, selling carrier 1 offers node 11,
but this node is not exchanged. However, node 14 could be exchanged,
and thereby, reduce the cost of servicing the network even further. The
auction will, however, terminate before this occurs. Thus, there could be
requests leading to savings if put on the auction, but the auction stops
before that could happen.
To improve the performance of the LRA, we introduce a tabu list. A
request is added to the tabu list when it is not reassigned during a round.
Accordingly, in the next round, the requests on the tabu list are not
considered. This allows for considering other candidates in the request
set besides the one with the largest marginal cost. Any time a request is
exchanged, the tabu list is emptied. Thus, in this manner, a larger number
of requests is considered. Note that when the tabu list is enabled, the
auction will only terminate after all information which is allowed to be
shared, is actually shared.
Combinatorial Reassignment Auction. In the Combinatorial Reassignment
Auction, each participant submits a single request at the same time,
which forms a set. All participants can then bid on all possible subsets of
this set. The combination of participants with the lowest bid have the
requests reassigned to them. Without a tabu list this variant is equivalent
to the Bundled Request Reassignment Auction (BRRA) as mentioned in
Berger and Bierwirth (2010). Note that, if only a single participant would
submit a single request, this variant would be identical to the LRA.
3.2.2. Multi-item auction sets
Intuitively, two requests positioned close to each other (either in
space or time) will most probably be also on the same route. Additionally,
the marginal cost of such an individual request is low. Clearly, when one
of the requests is already being served, it takes minimal effort to serve the
other request in close vicinity. The difference in the cost of the routing
plan and considered request is almost equal to the cost of the original
routing plan. The sets of requests with these properties are defined as
clusters. Similarly, Gansterer and Hartl (2016) stated that the
geographical location of the requests affects the performance of an
auction.
Clustered requests have a low individual marginal cost. The cluster as
a complete entity, however, may have a significant marginal cost. In the
LRA with candidate set size 1, the most expensive request is selected, but
not the most expensive cluster. In Fig. 4, a route serviced by selling
carriers 1 {11, 12, 13, 14, 15} is visualized. As bidding carrier 2 is closer
to all the nodes in the route, it could perform the route at a reduced cost.
However, if a single request is transferred to bidding carrier 2, the total
cost of the network increases. Carrier 1 bids lower than carrier 2 for this
request because it still has to service the requests for the remainder of the
route. The additional effort is then minimal. Routes similar to Fig. 4 will
not effectively be reallocated by the Limited Reassignment Auction with
candidate set size 1.
Based on the above insight, it is apparent that to maximize the cost
savings potential of an auction, the candidate set should be comprised of
bundled requests rather than individual requests.
Limited Reassignment Auction. For the Limited Reassignment Auction it
means that multi-item candidate sets will be submitted to the auction,
where entire sets are exchanged from one participant to the other. The
two selection methods that we investigate are the route-based request set
selection method and the cluster-based request set selection method. In
the route-based request set selection method a participant submits the
route with the highest marginal costs in his current plan to the auction. In
the cluster-based request set selection method, a participant identifies
clusters within routes, and subsequently submits the cluster with the
highest marginal cost. More details of these selection methods can be
found in Section 4.2.
Combinatorial Reassignment Auction. For the Combinatorial10Reassignment Auction we only introduce the route-based request set
selection method, in which a single participant submits a single route as
the candidate set. Compared to the Limited Reassignment Auction, the
cluster–based selection method will not be investigated. One would
expect that a dense cluster of requests will not be reassigned among
multiple participants. Since, similar to the logic as seen in Section 3.2.2, it
takes minimal effort to service request in close vicinity from each other.
Furthermore, as in the Combinatorial Reassignment it is possible to bid
on subsets of request.
Summary of the auctions. Summarizing, we investigate the five different
auctioning variants as indicated in Table 2.
4. Formal models
In this section we formally introduce the Limited Reassignment Auction
(LRA) and the Combinatorial Reassignment Auction (CRA). We generalize
the auctions introduced by Berger and Bierwirth (2010).
In what follows, SB indicates that the single request method is used
(equivalent to the SRRA Berger and Bierwirth (2010)), RB implies that
the route-based method is used, and CB implies that the cluster-based
method is used. Formal definitions of these are given in Section 4.2.
All auction variants with tabu indicate that the tabu list is enabled and
info indicates the maximum percentage of information which may be
revealed. For example, LRAðtabu;RB; 100%Þ indicates that the Reas-
signment Auction is executed with the route based request selection
method, the tabu list enabled and 100% of the information is allowed to
be shared. If info ¼ 50% maximally 50% of the requests may be revealed
in the Reassignment Auction. If multiple Reassignment Auctions are
performed sequentially, info ¼ 50% implies that if in the first Reassign-
ment Auction already 30% information is revealed, in the following
Reassignment Auction only 20% additional requests may be revealed.
The request already revealed in an earlier Reassignment Auction could
always be revealed in a following Reassignment Auction, as this infor-
mation has already become available to the other carriers.
Each carrier f 2 F has its own request set, Nf . Individual requests are
denoted as i, and a candidate set is denoted as I. S½Q is a solution of the
routing plan over a set of requests, Q. Let c½S½Q be the costs associated
with this solution.
Let Lf contain all possible candidate sets from Nf , based on the chosen
request set selection method. Consider a candidate set, I⊆Lf ; then mar-
ginal cost,mf ðIÞ, is equal to c½S½Nf   c½S½Nf n fIg. Bid bf ðIÞ of carrier f is
then equal to c½S½Nf [ fIg  c½S½Nf , which is the marginal cost of
adding candidate set I to the request set.
We reintroduce and formalize the steps from Section 3.1, where f is
the selling carrier:
 Step 1. For all candidate sets I⊆Lf , the marginal costs are computed,
mf ðIÞ¼ c½S½Nf  c½S½Nf n fIg .
 Step 2. From these sets, we select the most expensive set, I*, of re-
quests, I* ¼ arg maxfI ⊆Lf : mf ðIÞg.
 Step 3. Each participating carrier, g 2 F, bids on set I* with price
bgðI*Þ ¼ c½S½Ng [ fI*g c½S½Ng . In the case of a combinatorial
auction, bids are also made for all subsets of I*, where the formula for
the bid price is equivalent.
 Step 4. Reassignment of request set I* to the winning carrier, g* ¼
arg minfg 2 F : bgðI*Þg, takes place. The winning carrier, g, obtains an
updated set of requests, Ng* ¼ Ng* [ I* .
Each of these steps is discussed in detail in the following section.
4.1. The reassignment auction
As mentioned in 3.2.1, each participating carrier offers a candidate
set in the auction by turns. The exception to this is the CRAðSBÞ, where
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completed when each participating carrier has had his turn. The Reas-
signment Auction stops when no requests are exchanged during a round.
As mentioned in section 3.1, for each carrier, f 2 F, a tabu list can be
introduced, denoted by set Tf . Whenever a carrier, f, wins his own
candidate set, I, it is added to the tabu list, Tf . The auction terminates as
no further improvement can be made (i.e., when all the requests are on
one of the tabu lists), or if the maximum percentage (info) of requests is
revealed. The basic algorithm for the Limited Reassignment Auction,
LRAðtabuÞ, is presented in Fig. 5. Based on how the information allowed
to be revealed is limited, this algorithm can be adapted in two ways:
 In the first, the maximum amount of information to be revealed is
equal to a percentage of the requests. A request is seen as revealed if it
is placed at least once in the auction, and thus, have become visible to
the other participants. In the algorithm of Fig. 5, this means that in-
formation revealed is recorded, and the auction only continues while
this amount is smaller than parameter info.
 In the second option carriers have a predetermined set of requests that
are not allowed to be auctioned; they are designated non-
exchangeable. All candidate sets containing one of these requests
are a priori removed from Lf . The results of this are presented in
Section 6.2.3.
The Limited Reassignment Auction with tabu, LRAðtabuÞ.4.2. Request set selection methods
Determining the set Lf of all possible candidate sets of a single request
(i.e. the SB method) is trivial. However, as discussed earlier the marginal
cost for each individual request in a cluster may be low. In contrast, the
marginal cost for the cluster as a whole could be very high. Therefore, we
also introduced candidate sets containing multiple requests. In this sec-
tion, we discuss in detail the request selection methods RB and CB.
Route-based request set selection method (RB)
One potential request selection method is to select candidate set I on
the basis of routes, denoted as r⊆S½Nf . Running the Reassignment Auc-
tion with only routes will not explore the full cost savings potential.
Auctioning routes only allows for approximate improvements to the
network. Therefore, in our experiments a Limited Reassignment Auction
using the RBmethod is followed by a Limited Reassignment Auction with
single requests. When this set selection method is used, an additional
parameter RB is allotted to the RA.
Cluster-based request set selection method (CB)
In real-life and depending on the carrier, routes can contain numerous
requests. For routes above a certain size (> 4) of requests, the cluster
detection algorithm is introduced. This algorithm is based on the concept
that individual requests on a route that form a cluster have lower mar-
ginal costs. Allow us to first present an example of this concept.
Consider the following route, as visualized in Fig. 6:
route¼f5; 6; 9; 2; 4; 14; 12; 3; 11g
With the following associated marginal cost:
m¼f10:51; 1:67; 11:21; 12:67; 1:54; 0:76; 1:23; 14:53; 10:77g
Note that requests 6, 14,12 and 3 have far lower marginal costs than
average marginal cost for the route. Marginal costs of a certain request
are intuitively the difference in cost between the route including and
excluding that request. Thus, if one already has to go to a certain location,
the marginal cost of additional requests at that location will be lower.
Requests 14, 12 and 3 appear in sequence, which might (in the Figure it
does) indicate that they form a cluster. Request 6 might coincidentally be
on the way from 5 to 9. We can now formulate a methodology that11generates clusters on the basis of this information.
Suppose there is a vector, p, of sequential requests within a route, r,
for which the averagemarginal cost is significantly lower than for the rest
of the route, r. Then, this vector, p, is identified as a cluster. Formally,
vector p is defined as a cluster if the following holds:
P
i2pmf ðiÞ
jpjP
i2r:i 62pmf ðiÞ
jrjjpj
< α
Of course, the size of such a cluster depends on the choice of α. To this
end, to determine the best value for α, we will do multiple tests with
different values. Note that because this is a cluster detection mechanism,
vector p needs to be of minimum size 2. Vector p is determined by
sequentially checking the route for the existence of a pair of linked re-
quests for which the above statement holds. This set is then extended
with requests linked to this pair until the statement no longer holds. As a
result, all clusters are disjoint, and no cluster can contain the same
request. Vector p could then be considered a potential cluster and can be
an effective candidate set for the auction. Note that even when vector p is
not a cluster, a transfer of the set only happens when a competitor can
serve the set with less cost. Any route r can contain multiple clusters.
During each round, all potential clusters are determined. Once again, the
cluster with the highest marginal cost is selected for submission to the
Reassignment Auction. For all Reassignment Auctions the average cluster
size will be reported. When this set selection method is used, an addi-
tional parameter CB is allotted to the RA. The above-mentioned method
is processed in the algorithm in Fig. 7.
4.3. Combinatorial auctioning problem
The Combinatorial Auctioning Problem can be considered as a
replacement of Step 4 of the Reassignment Auction mentioned in section
3.1. When this is implemented, it results in the CRA. In the reallocation of
subsets, it is possible to reallocate parts of the candidate set to different
carriers. Only the RB set selection method is applied to CRA, and not the
CB. By the definition of a cluster, it is in general only attractive to a single
participant. Also, since each cluster is a subset of a route, the participants
will in the CRAðRBÞ already bid on these clusters as they need to bid on
each possible subset of the route. As a result, the CB set selection method
is not applied to CRA.
Given a set of carriers F, candidate set I and bids bf ðIkÞ that carriers f 2
F are willing to pay for a subset Ik⊆I, the objective is to minimize the cash
flow of the auction (i.e., to determine the reallocation of requests with a
minimum cost). The restriction is that every individual request i in
candidate set I is uniquely allocated to a carrier. All subsets of candidate
set I are generated. This results in the following integer programming
formulation, where xðIk; f Þ is 1 if the bundle Ik is allocated to carrier f and
0 otherwise.
minimize :
X
f2F
X
Ik⊆I
bf ðIkÞxðIk; f Þ
subject to :
X
Ik⊆I:i2Ik
X
f2F
xðIk; f Þ ¼ 1; 8i 2 I
xðIk ; f Þ 2 f0; 1g;8f 2 F 8i 2 I
This formulation assures that each individual request i is uniquely
allocated to a carrier f and that the total marginal cost is minimized. This
problem is known as the CAP and is categorized as NP-hard (De Vries and
Vohra (De Vries and Vohra, 2003)). In our experiments, however, the
Combinatorial Auctioning Problem is solved using complete enumera-
tion because of the small instances, which are determined by the length
of a single route. Note that the time-consuming part of the method is not
actually solving the CAP, but determining the bid prices and costs over all
possible subsets. The result is that the CAP is not computationally trac-
table for large instances. Because the Combinatorial Auctioning Problem
is an enhancement to step 4 of the reallocation of requests, more solution
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increase in savings resulting from this auction is expected to be more than
from the other implementations of the auction. A visual example is
presented in Fig. 8. For a more detailed explanation we refer to (Berger
and Bierwirth, 2010).
5. Routing algorithms
Our methodology will require many VRP calculations for which we
will use a state of the art methodology as discussed in 5.1. Next to that, to
discuss the performance of our approach, we need to know the optimal
solution for the central plan. The way to estimate the objective function
value for the central plan is discussed in 5.2.
5.1. Vehicle routing sub problems
To calculate S½Nf  a solution to the vehicle routing problem VRP(TW)
needs to be known. For the small instances, where carriers service
approximately 20 requests, the intermediate VRP(TW) computations can
be solved optimally using Gurobi 8.1 with short computation times. For
the huge instances the ALNS algorithm as mentioned in Pisinger and
Ropke (2007) is used as a heuristic for intermediate VRP(TW) compu-
tations. For the quality of this heuristic we refer to their paper. In the next
section the algorithm to compute the central plan is discussed.
5.2. Central plan
To asses the quality of the auction it is required that the central plan is
approximated, which is the solution to a Multi Depot Vehicle Routing
Problem (MDVRP). The MDVRP differs significantly from the CVRP in
that requests also have to be assigned to the depots. Finding exact solu-
tions for the problem sizes of our instances is not possible. Therefore, we
use a Genetic Hybrid Algorithm that follows the work of Ho et al. (2008).
The algorithm works similar to local search techniques, some offspring
(neighbours) are produced through a variety of genetic operations of the
current considered parent (“best found”) solution. The algorithm starts
with an initial solution, which in our algorithm is generated with the
ALNS algorithm, while in Ho et al. (2008) it is generated through Clarke
and Wright. Subsequently, the following steps are iterated:
1. Improvement Here different kind of inter-route and inter-depot swaps
are performed to obtain offspring.
2. Evaluate These offspring are subsequently evaluated according to the
fitness function. Our fitness function is different as a result of the
difference in objectives. Whereas Ho et al. (2008) has the objective of
minimizing the maximum delivery time among all routes, we have
the objective of minimizing the total travel distance. We use as fitness
function simply the sum of the driving distances over all used arcs,
which is the traditional MDVRP objective function, EvalðXhÞ ¼Pnþf
i¼0
Pnþf
j¼0 cijxij.
3. SelectionFrom the offspring a roulette wheel selection is used to select
offspring that undergo mutations.
4. Genetic OperationsMutations are then applied to the selected offspring
.
This algorithm provides good results in reasonable computation times
compared to the best known solutions in literature, which we show in
Table 9 in the Appendix. The average gap of the solution of our central
plan algorithm to the best known central plan is 4.9%, with a standard
deviation of 2.2%. This makes it accurate enough to provide valid in-
sights for our auctioning algorithms.
6. Results
First we discuss the instances in more detail, and then, an extensive12numerical analysis is discussed.
6.1. Instances
Two types of instances are considered in this study: small and a
real–life based case. The small instances contain 60 requests, the real–life
based instance contains 2967 requests. The real–life based instance is
based on real-life data, contains a number of requests similar to real-life
carriers, and is discussed in more detail in Section 6.2.5. Additionally, the
Cordeau et al. (1997) instances are used to test the effectiveness of the
Limited Reassignment Auction and to validate our approach for
approximating the central plan. This is performed by randomly assigning
requests to each of the depots and subsequently testing the best per-
forming (on our self-generated instances) LRA auctioning variant. Inde-
pendent of how the requests are allocated to the carriers, the solution of
the central plan remains the same. Therefore we consider the best known
solution for the original instance in Cordeau et al. (1997) as the optimal
solution for the central plan.
Note that instances with 60 requests are not considered normal for
real-life vehicle routing problems, but they are used to validate the
presented methodology. During the auction the participant has to
determine the marginal costs for each separate requests. As an
example, if a carrier has a set of 20 requests, the vehicle routing
problem needs to be solved 20 times. When 20 requests are exchanged
then a vehicle routing problem needs to be solved 400 times, only for
determining the marginal costs. Both the bidding and effect of the tabu
list is not included here, which could even raise the amount more
substantially.
For the small test cases, random instances are generated on a surface
of 100 100. Unless otherwise stated, the depots of the carriers are
positioned on the vertices of the triangle ff20;20g; f20;80g; f80; 50gg.
The choice of these vertices is based on dividing the surface into three
similar hinterlands. Subsequently, 60 requests are randomly positioned
on the surface and randomly allocated to the carriers. Unless otherwise
stated, 100 instances are generated. The capacity of the vehicles is set as
5 requests. The re-positioning costs are chosen to be 70% less costly than
normal daily operations.
6.2. Experiments
In this section, we first present the results of the Reassignment Auc-
tion on the randomly generated small instances (n ¼ 60) in Section 6.2.1.
Additional experimental setups were chosen to provide insight into the
effects of several potentially performance varying externalities, such as,
the presence of time windows (Section 6.2.2), the amount of information
allowed to be revealed (Section 6.2.3) and the positions of the depots of
the carriers (Section 6.2.4). For each implementation, the percentage
deviation from the central plan is presented as well as the savings with
respect to the case where there is no collaboration and the amount of
information (i.e., requests) revealed. Note that the auctioning mecha-
nisms are based on servicing costs. We assume that the three carriers
have similar costs per distance measure and therefore the savings are
interpreted as a reduction in the total distance driven by the 3 carriers. In
all tables, the average of the performance over 100 instances is repre-
sented as μ and the standard deviation is represented as σ.
In principle we have 6 implementations of the Reassignment Auction
which we test in our experiments:
1. LRAðSB; infoÞ, the Limited Reassignment Auction of single requests,
which is equivalent to the Single Request Reassignment Auction of
Berger and Bierwirth (2010).
2. LRAðtabu; SB; infoÞ, the Limited Reassignment Auction of single re-
quests with an enabled tabu list.
3. LRAðtabu; RB; infoÞ → LRAðtabu; SB; infoÞ, the Route Based Limited
Reassignment Auction followed by a Limited Reassignment Auction
of single requests with an enabled tabu list.
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three Limited Reassignment Auctions applied sequentially that are
route based, cluster detection based, and single item versions, in
which the tabu list is enabled.
5. CRAðSB; infoÞ, the Combinatorial Reassignment Auction of single re-
quests, equivalent to the Bundle Request Reassignment Auction of
Berger and Bierwirth (2010).
6. CRAðtabu; RB; infoÞ, the Route Based Combinatorial Reassignment
Auction.
In most experiments, we allow all information to be shared (i.e.
info ¼ 100%. However in Section 6.2.3 we discuss the effects of different
values for info. Also for the real–life based case, Section 6.2.5, different
values of info are tested. Note that info is not shared among participants,
but simply an evaluation measurement.
Of these Reassignment Auction variants CRAðtabu;RB; 100%Þ is ex-
pected to be the best performing auction. Since the Combinatorial
Reassignment Auction is computationally very slow, we have only
additionally included the variant CRAðSB;100%Þ. This also allows for a
comparison with the Bundle Request Reassignment Auction of Berger
and Bierwirth (2010) which is the same.
6.2.1. Results of the reassignment auction
The results of the Reassignment Auction are presented in Table 3.
For each implementation of the auction, the average and standard de-
viation (over the 100 instances) of the deviation (gap) from the central
plan, savings with respect to no collaboration, and the percentage of
requests revealed to all participants are stated in the table. Note that
setting info ¼ 100% allows for revelation of all the requests on the
auction. The effect of varying this parameter is discussed in the
following section, as well as marking requests as nonexchangeable.
Note that LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;CB; 100%Þ → LRAðtabu; SB;
100%Þ is only a marginal improvement over LRAðtabu; RB; 100%Þ →
LRAðtabu;SB;100%Þ. To maintain parity with the real–life based case of
Section 6.2.5, an α of 0.25 was chosen for the cluster detection algo-
rithm. The average size of a cluster in LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;
CB; 100%Þ → LRAðtabu; SB;100%Þ was 2.01, though it should be noted
that a cluster was rarely transferred in these instances. CRAðtabu;RB;
100%Þ is always the best performer. The difference in the performances
between CRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ and LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu;
SB;100%Þ is significant, indicating that routes are not necessarily good
indicators for clusters.
Although LRAðSB; 100%Þ may reveal all requests on the auction, it
mostly terminates very fast (after approximately 29% of the requests are
placed on the reassignment auction). This is expected as the tabu list is
not enabled. However, sharing this 30% of the requests already leads to
22% savings on average, or 6.1% savings when re-positioning of the
goods amongst the depots is necessary. Note that the savings when
re–positioning is taken into account is significantly lower. This implies
that the difference in distance between the carriers is of significant effect
on the actual realized savings.
6.2.2. Results for the reassignment auction applied to the VRPTW
The results for the carriers which solve the VRP with Time Win-
dows are presented in Table 4. The VRPTW is in general a routing
problem that for the considered carriers has the most practical rele-
vance. It can be observed that the performance does not deviate much
from the performance of the auctions applied without the time win-
dows, though the savings increase somewhat. These results support
the conjecture that the reassignment auction also achieves a good
performance on instances with time windows. Time windows create
additional restrictions in the routing problem. This results in a greater
difference between the costs of the single and central plan. As the
Reassignment Auction still approaches the central plan, though being
less effective, the savings increase substantially as a consequence.136.2.3. Value of information
The relation between the percentage of requests shared and savings
for the 100 instances is presented in a scatter plot in Fig. 9 for 4 of the
Reassignment Auction variants. For the methods with tabu list enabled,
all information is shared and the figures provide an indication about the
spread of the savings. For LRAðSB; infoÞ it can be seen that the amount of
savings gained by revealing extra information is quite stable as all dots
are positioned along a straight line. However, remember that in this
situation we did not control the information shared (i.e. the auction
stopped because in one round no request was exchanged).
For methods with the tabu list enabled we could control the amount
of information shared. In Fig. 10, the effect of the different values of info
on the LRAðtabu; SB; infoÞ and CRAðtabu;RB; infoÞ implementations is
shown. The maximum percentage of requests that is allowed to be
revealed on the auction (info) is presented on the horizontal axis. The
carriers cannot reveal any new requests at the auction after info% of the
total number of requests have already been revealed on the reassignment
auction. Hundred instances are tested for the settings of info from 0 to
100% in steps of 5%. The thick horizontal red line is the average savings
achieved by implementing the central plan. This allows us to illustrate
the gain in savings when a certain maximum percentage of information is
revealed per carrier. On average the CRAðtabu;RB; infoÞ leads to larger
savings than the LRAðtabu; SB; infoÞ implementation while revealing the
same amount of information. One can observe that the trend lines over
the observations have a decreasing slope. This can be attributed to the
fact that the requests with the highest marginal costs are auctioned off
first, and that most of the savings potential is gained in the first rounds of
the auction. Moreover, the slope at the tail end of the trend line is equal to
zero for most instances. Here no more savings are made. This implies that
not all the information has to be revealed to obtain the maximum savings
potential. After about 70% of information has been revealed the auctions
more or less reached the maximum level. This is intuitively logical as we
would expect the Reassignment Auction to approach the central plan. As
expected, 1/3 of the request set of each carrier is in its own area of ser-
vice, and thus, does not need to be revealed.
Furthermore, we have tested the effects of having a predefined subset
of requests being determined non–exchangeable. This has been per-
formed with values 10%, 20%, 30% and 40% of the requests being not
available for exchange. In these experiments, we did not update the
central plan benchmark. The central plan still allows for all requests to be
exchanged. The results can be seen in Figure 11. Note that as expected,
the gap to the central plan is increasing and the savings (with or without
re-positioning), are decreasing. Note also that the incline for the best
performing Reassignment Auction, CRAðtabu;RB; 100%Þ is higher than
for the least performing Reassignment Auction, LRAðSB; 100%Þ. This
could be due to the fact that the best potential solution gets further
removed from the best known solution. The savings with re-positioning
become 0 for LRAðSB;100%Þ when 40% of requests become non-
exchangeable. With the cluster-based request set selection method more
savings are achieved with less information shared.
6.2.4. Results with regards to the sensitivity of the depot locations
In this section, the sensitivity of the performance of the Reassignment
Auction to the depot locations is tested and the results are presented.
The analysis leaves the service regions of the carriers equal to 1=f .
Each carrier has to serve 20 nodes, and there are f ¼ 3 carriers. The
depots of the three carriers are located on a circle, whose radius is a
control variable. This implies that only the distance between the depots is
increased, but the shape of the service regions remains unchanged.
LRAðtabu;RB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu; SB;100%Þ is used as the auction
mechanism. The graph corresponding to this method for the three car-
riers is shown in Fig. 12. Note that as the distance between the facilities
increases, the effects of the cost of re-positioning become greater.
6.2.5. Results for a real–life based case
A case with an more practical problem size is introduced based on the
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order set consists of 2967 individual orders. The location of two depots of
their competitors is known. A portion of the known order set of the first
depot was assigned to the other depots, in order to make the example
more realistic. This was performed based on the notion that a depot is
probably close to his own customer portfolio. Note that only the
assignment of requests to the depots has changed.
On a route there are on average 15 requests, depending on the ca-
pacity and demand. The capacity of each truck is 30 m2, and requests use
2 m2 on average. The result of sequentially performing a reassignment
auction with the selectionmethods of routes, clusters, and single item (all
with a tabu list enabled) is investigated (LRAðtabu; RB; 100%Þ →
LRAðtabu;CB;100%Þ → LRAðtabu; SB;100%Þ). The savings are based on
kilometers driven. The algorithm to solve the routing problem is the
ALNS algorithm, as discussed in Section 5.
The cluster detection method requires a value for α between 0 and
0.5. The results for certain values of α are presented in Table 6, based on
the which α ¼ 0:25 was ultimately chosen for our example.
Based on the results of the real–life based case (Table 8, Figure 14), it
can be observed that the performance of the auction mechanism is still
very good even for problems of this size, where the road distance instead
of the Euclidean distance is used. The number of kilometers driven is
33.426 with no collaboration, 26.094 with the Limited Reassignment
Auction, and 23.094 with the central plan. Kilometers driven reaches
27.810, when re-positioning of the goods is taken into account. If there is
a maximum percentage info allowed to be shared (Fig. 13), the value of
information follows a similar pattern as in Fig. 9. Sharing 20% of infor-
mation leads to more than 10% savings. The cash-flows are visible in
Table 7. Note that carrier 2 has a negative difference, indicating that it
has absorbed more than it has sold. This is compensated by the other
participants. Again, a fair redistribution of the savings will be a research
topic on its own.
7. Conclusions
Collaboration between carriers is desirable to reduce carbon emis-
sions, kilometers driven and cost. Carriers, however, are reluctant to
share information with their competitors. Joint planning, which requires
perfect information, thus, becomes infeasible. If carriers would be willing
to share small amounts of information iteratively, an auction becomes a
possibility for exchanging requests. Such an auction could be imple-
mented on an electronic platform. In this study, we generalize the
Reassignment Auction as introduced by Berger and Bierwirth (2010) to the
Limited Reassignment Auction and Combinatorial Reassignment Auction.
Additional extensions are introduced: adding a tabu list and introducing
a cluster detection algorithm for the LRA. A set of auction variants is
subsequently applied to carriers that solve a VRP(TW) as their routing
problem. The algorithms are designed to solve large-scale problems. The
results from the instances generated by the auction provide us with the
following valuable insights:
1. Initially, large savings are gained by sharing little information. As
such, the mechanisms performs well in environments with little trust.142. By including a tabu list, the Limited Reassignment Auction performs
relatively well, though ultimately it does not reach the cost savings
potential of the central plan. However, the participants can easily
control the amount of information they share to achieve savings. The
results are independent of whether or not time windows are present
for the requests.
3. The Reassignment Auction performs best when bundles of requests
are auctioned. The selection methods for these bundles are important
for the performance. Two variants of the selectionmethodwere tested
for the LRA, namely, route based and cluster detection based. Both
selection methods performed excellently with the randomly gener-
ated instances we tested. However, the Combinatorial Reassignment
Auction variants performed better, almost achieving the central plan.
Finally, a sequence of Limited Reassignment Auctions were applied to
a reallife size case, and this variant performed very well.
4. The Combinatorial Reassignment Auction solves the reassignment of
requests and approaches the central plan in terms of the cost savings
potential, but it is computationally expensive and reveals significant
information. By implementing three successive Limited Reassignment
Auctions, route-based, followed by cluster detection based, and single
item (all with an enabled tabu list), already most of the savings po-
tential is achieved, while requiring a considerably lower computation
time. The Reassignment Auction yields cost savings potential in close
agreement with that of the central plan for all our test cases.
5. There is a balance in the distance between the depots. Initially, as the
distance between the depots increases, more of the region is covered
by the depots, yielding higher savings. However, after a certain dis-
tance the cost of re-positioning also start to increase substantially.
6. The real–life based case shows that the savings made through the
Request Reassignment Auction method can be varying for the par-
ticipants, depending on their original allocation of requests.
Summarized, the Reassignment Auction is a very viable collaborative
environment for carriers with which large savings can be obtained.
The following areas are identified for future research:
 In our research, we used complete solutions to the routing problem to
obtain the shadow prices (marginal cost) of the requests. This is
computationally expensive, and better methods could exist. Further
research could be performed for estimating the shadow prices of the
requests in the network.
 In our work, a transaction takes place each time a request is reas-
signed. Savings are gained from this reassignment, but the allocation
of these savings was not in the scope of this research. Similar topics
related to game theory, such as strategic bidding, were not investi-
gated. This opens the door for interesting research on the player
behavior in such auctions.
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Table 9
Results for the cordeau instances.
Inst Size BKR CP Gap Inst Size BKR CP Gap15p01 n50k4 576.87 598.16 3.69% p18 n240k6 3702.85 3913.84 5.70%
p02 n50k4 473.53 492.43 3.99% p19 n240k6 3827.06 3977.57 3.93%
p03 n70k5 641.19 648.24 1.10% p20 n240k6 4058.07 4439.09 9.39%
p04 n100k2 1001.59 1056.68 5.50% p21 n360k9 5474.84 5841.61 6.70%
p05 n100k2 750.04 792.79 5.70% p22 n360k9 5702.16 6083.80 6.69%
p06 n100k3 876.50 931.72 6.30% p23 n360k9 6095.46 6475.90 6.24%
p07 n100k4 885.80 954.01 7.70% pr01 n48k4 861.32 906.44 5.24%
p08 n249k2 4437.68 4584.12 3.30% pr02 n96k4 1307.61 1395.65 6.73%
p09 n249k3 3900.22 4216.14 8.10% pr03 n144k4 1806.60 1885.45 4.36%
p10 n249k4 3663.02 3857.16 5.30% pr04 n192k4 2072.52 2145.05 3.50%
p11 n249k5 3554.18 3792.31 6.70% pr05 n240k4 2385.77 2428.08 1.77%
p12 n80k2 1318.95 1332.36 1.02% pr06 n288k4 2723.27 2788.84 2.41%
p13 n80k2 1318.95 1332.36 1.02% pr07 n72k6 1089.56 1135.84 4.25%
p14 n80k2 1360.12 1459.41 7.30% pr08 n144k6 1666.60 1755.84 5.35%
p15 n160k2 2505.42 2610.65 4.20% pr09 n216k6 2153.10 2265.06 5.20%
p16 n160k4 2572.23 2654.54 3.20% pr10 n288k6 2921.85 2979.68 1.98%
p17 n160k4 2709.09 2763.27 2.00%InstInstance name.
SizeProblem Size: The number after n denotes # of requests, the number after k denotes # of depots. BKRBest Known Result (http://neo.lcc.uma.es/vrp/vrp-instances/
multiple-depot-vrp-instances/visited September 4, 2019).
CPOur Central Plan approximation (Section 5.2).
GapPercent difference between CP and BKR.References
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